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BOOK REVIEW
Pension Plans and Public Policy. WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH &
FRANCIS P. KING. New York: Columbia University Press. 1976.
Pp. xi, 311. $15.00.
Impending financial doom in New York City has been averted
several times through massive loans from city workers' pension
funds.' Such loans, if made by private employer pension funds,
might well have been illegal.2 Yet there has been no public outcry
from the workers whose pensions are threatened, presumably be-
cause the action taken is considered necessary to preserve their
jobs. Nor has the public voiced any protest, perhaps because a
good share of the responsibility for the debacle can be attributed to
the unions' extraction of generous pension benefits.
In part, the lesson to be learned by the rest of the nation from
the financial crisis of its principal city is the need for pension plan-
ning. The impediment to absorbing that lesson is ignorance-an
ignorance of the concepts, operations, benefits, and costs of pen-
sion plans that afflicts both political leaders 3 and the general pub-
lic. Such ignorance is not surprising, since the facts are complex,
the issues are not immediate, and the basic vocabulary of pension
plans is itself intimidating. But the tremendous expansion of Social
Security and private and public pensions, and the accumulation of
huge pension reserves, make sound social and economic planning
for the United States impossible without an understanding of the
role and effects of pension planning.
In Pension Plans and Public Policy, William Greenough and
Francis King attempt to dispel this ignorance. They clearly and
simply present basic concepts, thoroughly explain the structure,
costs, and benefits of pension plans, and give balanced considera-
tion to public policy analyses and proposals. Although the ex-
I See, e.g., Raskin, Pension Trustees Juggling Inherent Interest Conflicts, N.Y. Times, Mar.
16, 1977, at D1, col. 3.
2 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 404(a)(1)(B)-(C), 407(a),
29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1)(B)-(C), 1107(a) (Supp. V 1975).
3 "Former Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peterson, who headed a private commis-
sion on federal salaries last year, said he was struck by the number of House and Senate
members who 'are unaware of these huge future pension costs.'" Journal of Commerce,
Feb. 24, 1977, at 2, col. 4.
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planatory sections are designed primarily for the nonprofessional,
the policy recommendations deserve the attention of all interested
citizens, experts and laymen alike.
The three major components of the American pension system
analyzed by Greenough and King are Social Security, private pen-
sions, and public employee pensions.
I
SOCIAL SECURITY
Social Security is the foundation of the American retirement
system, covering more than ninety percent of our workers. It is the
sole support of many retirees, while for others it provides a base to
which private or public pension benefits, or personal savings, are
added for a comfortable retirement income.
Although the amount of Social Security benefits received de-
pends on the worker's pre-retirement income, the funds used to
pay those benefits are provided by current taxes. Thus, the Social
Security taxes paid by a worker and his employer are not set aside,
invested, and accumulated to provide for his own retirement.
Rather, they are used currently to pay benefits to workers who
have already retired.4
Under the existing Social Security system, there are about
three workers for each retired person receiving benefits.5 Demo-
graphic factors indicate that by the year 2030 this ratio will have
declined to about two workers for each retiree.6 Taxes on both the
employer and the employee will thus have to rise by approximately
fifty percent merely to provide the same level of benefits. Under
4 An increase in wages provides workers with some degree of protection against infla-
tion. This protection is not available to retired persons. To counter the effects of inflation,
Congress amended the Social Security Act in 1972 to trigger automatic increases in ben-
efits with rises in the consumer price index. See Act of July 1, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-336,
§ 202(a)(1), 86 Stat. 406 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 415(i) (Supp. V 1975)). However, the 1972
amendment coupled the current workers' entitlement formula as well as the retired work-
ers' benefit formula to the consumer price index, with results that were as unintended as
they are dramatic. For example, a worker entering employment today, who receives 5% an-
nual wage increases until retirement in 2025, would retire with a pension of 130% of his
final salary, if inflation during this period were 4% per year. On the other hand, if the
inflation rate were 2%, he would receive a pension of only 49% of his final salary. That
such a senseless disparity remains uncorrected illustrates the complexity of the subject. See
pp. 100-03.
5 P. 97.6Id.
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these circumstances, it is doubtful whether the workers of 2030 will
look with favor upon the Social Security system.
Greenough and King offer as a possible solution the extension
of the normal retirement age to sixty-eight. 7 This would increase
the size of the working population as compared with the popula-
tion of retired persons. The effect on each worker would be to
extend the period during which Social Security taxes must be paid,
defer the receipt of benefits, and reduce the period during which
benefits are provided.
The arithmetic is sound, but what about the sociology? The
authors speculate on the advantages of a longer work life, but the
trend in public preferences seems to be toward earlier retirement.8
Further study is needed on this question, but economic and politi-
cal realities may necessitate the postponement of retirement as suc-
ceeding generations of workers object to paying the steeply increas-
ing taxes required to maintain the present system.
II
PRIVATE EMPLOYER PENSION PLANS
Private pension plans cover approximately half of the workers
employed in the private sector. 9 The dominant recent development
in this area was the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),10 which marks a shift in public pol-
icy from a tax-based orientation to direct government regulation
of private pension planning and operations. Perhaps because this
program is still in its early stages, Greenough and King do not deal
with some of the potentially serious problems that have already
surfaced.
For example, in discussing the investment of pension plan
funds, the authors advocate a broader dispersal of investments,
which could benefit the capital needs of small businesses."
ERISA's fiduciary responsibility provisions, however, have caused
many managers of pension plan funds to adopt a conservative in-
vestment philosophy, resulting in reduced investment in common
7 P. 104.
1 Pp. 223-26.
9 P. 109.
1 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26,
29, 31, 42 U.S.C.).
11 Pp. 149-52.
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stock and other risk investments and greater reliance on high-qual-
ity fixed-income securities. Because portfolio managers face an
increased threat of personal liability under ERISA, it is unlikely
that pension plan funds will provide a major source of venture
capital for small and growing businesses.
. In discussing the vesting of pension benefits, the authors ac-
knowledge the importance of ERISA's vesting provisions, but view
them as only the first step toward the long-range goal of full and
immediate vesting.' 2 Since the enactment of ERISA, however, the
number of new pension plans established in the United States has
declined significantly, and terminations of existing plans have been
more numerous than anticipated. To what extent this adverse ex-
perience is attributable to ERISA's vesting, participation, funding,
and other cost-increasing requirements is currently the subject of
considerable dispute. Some argue that the recent economic reces-
sion has been the major contributing cause, and that in any case
many plans were properly terminated because they were inade-
quately funded. Nevertheless, any further liberalization of ERISA's
vesting and other requirements should await the results of studies
investigating whether ERISA has had the unintended, undesirable
effect of restricting the growth of private pension plans.
An important policy proposal, not mentioned by the authors,
would change federal income tax law to provide for limited deduct-
ibility of employee contributions to employer pension plans. Such a
provision could result in a substantial increase in pension plan
funding and benefits. Congress recently took a small step in this
direction by providing that employees not covered by an employer
pension plan could establish their own tax-deductible plans, known
as individual retirement accounts or annuities.' 3 Extending this
tax-deductible treatment to cover employee contributions to the
employer's pension plan is the logical next step.
Our one basic disagreement with the Greenough and King
analysis of private pension plans relates to their comparative evalu-
ation of the two basic types of private plans. The two plans differ
in their initial focus: the defined contribution plan focuses on the
sums to be set aside during the worker's career, while the defined
benefit plan focuses on the sums to be paid out after retirement.
12 pp. 153-55.
13 See I.R.C. §§ 219, 408 (added by Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2002(a)(1),(b), 88 Stat. 829); I.R.C. § 220 (added by Tax Reform Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1501(a), 90 Stat. 1520).
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Under the defined contribution plan, a stated percentage of salary
is contributed regularly to the plan until retirement, when a pen-
sion is provided on the basis of whatever sum has accumulated.
Under the defined benefit plan, a stated percentage of salary (usu-
ally calculated on a final-years'-average basis) is paid out as a pen-
sion after retirement, with annual contributions to the plan fixed at
whatever level is necessary for the orderly accumulation of a fund
sufficient to provide the pension.
Of course, the percentage of salary to be contributed each year
under a defined contribution plan can be derived by calculating
the desired pension as a percentage of the worker's salary during
his final years of employment, making assumptions as to the in-
terest to be earned on the accumulating funds. Unfortunately, this
type of plan is subject to the risk that if the interest earnings prove
to be lower than predicted, or if there are unexpected increases in
salary toward retirement, the targeted pension will not be achieved.
The chief virtue of the plan is its essential simplicity, allowing the
employee at every point to calculate the amount accumulated in his
account. It also has the advantage that a worker may leave one job
to enter another with a similar type of plan without endangering
his final pension, if his benefits have been vested along the way.
In contrast, under the defined benefit plan, contributions to
the plan are determined according to various actuarial formulae,
with the objective of accumulating a fund sufficient to pay exactly
the prescribed benefit-for example, sixty percent of the worker's
average salary during his last five years of employment. This type
of plan has the advantage that, despite any errors in the interest
projections and any changes in salary structure, the plan remains
obligated to pay the predetermined benefit. Thus, the plan-
rather than the participant-bears investment and inflation risks.
The comparative disadvantage of the defined benefit plan, how-
ever, is that the sums accumulated for a particular worker at any
time prior to retirement are likely to be less than those accumu-
lated under the defined contribution plan. Thus, a worker who
frequently changes jobs under roughly equivalent plans, may re-
ceive a greater benefit under the defined contribution plan.
Pleading the justification that defined contribution plans "are
not usually covered adequately in pension literature,"' 4 the authors
depart from their well-balanced approach in other areas to em-
phasize the advantages of the defined contribution plan while
14 P. 176.
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generally ignoring its detriments. Conversely, they underscore the
drawbacks of the defined benefit plan while largely ignoring its
advantages. 15
Clearly, the retiring worker's primary concern is the amount
he will receive as a pension, and not the method used to accumu-
late the necessary funds. A worker retiring today, whose salary was
fairly stable over a long period of time but which increased dramat-
ically with the last decade's inflation, will receive under a defined
benefit plan a pension based on those last few years of inflation-
adjusted salary. Under a defined contribution plan, however, that
same worker would have had larger yearly contributions added to
his account during the last few years of employment, but would
receive a pension that does not represent as high a percentage of
his final salary.
The choice between these two basic types of plans, and their
variations, will usually rest on a determination as to which is better
suited to industry characteristics, particular types of businesses,
and employee characteristics within a particular firm. Owners of
small businesses, for example, will tend to favor the defined benefit
plan, which meets the needs of older employees, usually including
the owners, for whom there is insufficient time to build up an
adequate fund under a defined contribution plan. Thus it is sim-
plistic to characterize one type of plan as clearly superior to the
other.
III
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYER PENSION PLANS
Like so many other American institutions, our retirement sys-
tem represents a compromise that works well but not perfectly. An
attempt to make the system perfect would probably destroy it, but
allowing it to run its present course would probably destroy it as
well. The greatest danger lies in the governmental segments of the
system. Proliferating government pension promises have in many
cases outstripped the capacity of taxpayers to bear their cost.' 6
There is nothing wrong with providing generous benefits to em-
ployees, public or private. But someone must pay for them. The
public pays for a large part of increased benefits in private plans
1See pp. 182-89.
16 Of course, these commitments were compounded by the 1972 amendments to the
Social Security Act. See note 4 supra.
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through higher prices. These are normally subject to the restraints
of competitive forces and the willingness of the public to pay. Gov-
ernment, on the other hand, has little or no competition for its
services, and the public has little freedom in choosing whether to
pay its taxes.
The financial troubles of the nation's largest city recently fo-
cused attention on New York's unusually generous state and city
pension plans. Greenough and King point out, however, that the
plans of many other states and municipalities are even more dras-
tically underfunded than New York's, while all of these pale in
comparison to the underfunding of federal employee pension
plans, where the assets fall short of incurred liabilities by close to
$300 billion. 17 What all this means, apart from an occasional
municipal bankruptcy, is that future generations of taxpayers will
have to bear enormous burdens created by legislators they did not
elect. Add the coupling effect of the 1972 Social Security amend-
ments' 8 to the large number of overly generous public retirement
systems, stir in some demographic factors, and you have the pre-
scription for a gigantic social disaster sometime between thirty-five
and fifty years from now. If this seems too far off to worry about,
consider that persons now entering the work force will expect to
live on their retirement income at just about that time.
One possible solution may be the creation of a brother for
ERISA, named GERISA-a Government Employees Retirement
Income Security Act. Greenough and King carefully and convinc-
ingly set forth the public policy to be implemented in this area.' 9 If
Congress sets its own house in order, lawyers may be confronted
with the as-yet-unmentioned but intriguing question of whether
Congress possesses the constitutional power to compel states and
.municipalities to do the same for their own employees.
Harry P. Kamen*
GerardJ. Talbot**
17 See pp. 202-03. This figure assumes a modest 4% inflation rate.
Not only are the funds inadequate, but their investment is hardly calculated to produce
a very satisfactory return. While the tax-exempt state pension funds have generally cor-
rected their incredible practice of investing in low yielding tax-exempts (from 25% of assets
in 1956 to less than 2% in 1973), the federal civil service retirement system remains invested
in lower yielding federal government obligations. See pp. 136, 144.
18 See note 4supra.
19 Pp. 203-06.
* Vice-President and Associate General Counsel, Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany. A.B. 1954, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B. 1957, Harvard University.
** Vice-President and Tax Counsel, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. A.B. 1953,
LL.B. 1958, Fordham University; LL.M. 1962, New York University.
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